Europe's new neighbours:
A post-enlargement strategy for European foreign policy
tabled by PES Vice-Chairs, Rudolf Scharping and Jan Marinus Wiersma
I. Summary
II. Europe's traditions
III. EU Enlargement 2004
IV. Different neighbours - different strategies
V. Russia and the new neighbours in the East
VI. South East Europe
VII. Turkey
VIII. The Meditteranean region
IX. Challenges facing EU policy
X. PES Tasks
I. Summary
The long-term objective of making Europe stable and democratic is more important than establishing strict timetables for further EU enlargements. Apart from enlargement, there remain other ways to promote European values beyond the EU's borders. Both processes will help to avoid new divisions, either in Europe or in relation to the Mediterranean area.
We welcome the ten new members. The enlarged EU will have to invest in making the 1 May 2004 enlargement a success. It will not be an automatic process.
Bulgaria and Romania are not part of the present enlargement round. The EU has an obligation to try to finish the negotiations with these countries in good time to make their accession possible in 2007. This requires efforts from both sides.
Once Turkey complies with the Copenhagen political criteria, accession negotiations should start. A successful outcome of these negotiations will depend on whether Turkey continues to fulfil the political criteria and the economic conditions, and whether it is capable of implementing the acquis. In the lead up to the possible start of the accession negotiations with Turkey, the EU and Turkey should consider closer co-operation, in particular with regard to the wider Middle East region, the Mediterranean and concerning other issues of common interest in foreign and security policies.
Reinforcing and enhancing the stability of the southeast European region and an active role of the countries concerned are pre-conditions for considering future applications for membership. The long-term perspective for the countries of the Western Balkans clearly must be one of full European integration.
Enlargement is not the raison d’être of the EU and is not the only way to promote European values. Moreover, these further enlargements could potentially create tensions and political instability amongst current EU Member States and their citizens. We, as Social Democrats, should take these factors into account when considering our position on these future enlargements.
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova need a regime change before they can embark upon a credible application for EU membership. The PES will take initiatives to promote democracy in these countries.
Relations with the Mediterranean should move beyond the current trade agreements. We should seek to identify areas of closer co-operation. The PES will step up its work on these questions and urge the EU institutions to promote a new and more coherent neighbourhood policy as part of Common Foreign and Security Policies of the Union.
II. Europe's traditions
The current round of enlargement raises the question of the European Union's approach to the states on its new borders. This calls for a debate on clarifying the traditions, possibilities and limits of European integration and formulating a flexible and comprehensive EU foreign policy towards neighbouring states.
European integration is a success story. After two devastating world wars, dictatorships and monstrous crimes, the European Community, followed by the European Union, has enjoyed nearly 60 years of peace, democracy and prosperity.
In the course of enlargement, the Community has also integrated states that have turned their back on dictatorial regimes and has thereby helped establish democracy in these states in the long term. The 2004 round of enlargement is aimed at finally overcoming the division of the continent by the East-West conflict.
In the wake of all these successes, the question now arises of the Union's approach to its neighbours, some of which are new. Despite all these successes, we need to think consider carefully how far the Union can enlarge without overstretching itself and thus putting itself in a position in which it can no longer successfully carry out its tasks of safeguarding peace, democracy and prosperity.
The discussions about Turkey's possible membership of the EU have shown that applying only formal political, institutional and economic criteria are insufficient in face of the future enlargement of the Union. Otherwise the EU could in theory take in countries from every continent.
Nor do geographical and historical definitions of Europe offer adequate means of resolving the question of which states could be offered the prospect of EU membership. Europe is founded on the ideals of the European Enlightenment and humanism. The European community of values is based on human rights, democracy, social responsibility, equal opportunities and a balance between performance and solidarity, the individual and the state.
It is Europe's responsibility to safeguard these common values in a rapidly changing and increasingly interdependent world. To that end it must remember its core civilisation and make this the measure of the way it considers and evaluates its approach to its neighbours. In so doing, the European Union must take into account possible undesired reactions that could lead to destabilisation by not allowing other interested states to join.
At the same time, it is up to Europe to develop strategies and new forms of partnership for shaping its relations with neighbours that have no prospect of joining the Union even in the future. These partnerships must take as much account of Europe's own interests as of its neighbours' and build up and develop these relations to the advantage of both sides.
In a multipolar world, due account must also be taken of Europe's role as a global factor and the global responsibility this implies.
III. EU enlargement 2004
In view of the forthcoming enlargement of the EU, the political actors must enhance its capacity for foreign policy action against the backdrop of its growing territorial, economic and demographic dimensions and the growing variety of perceptions.
The 2004 round of enlargement of 10 states and 75 million citizens could potentially increase the EU's international influence. However, this will not be automatic: to achieve this, the Union must become genuinely capable of action in foreign and security policy, as also in foreign trade and development policy, and if the EU states co-ordinate their action in international organisations.
Although the states that will be joining the Union in 2004 are well prepared for their journey towards the Community, they will have to continue to concentrate on their internal development.
In the new EU of 25 member states, it will not be easier for Europe to reach agreements in order to act in a global context. If Europe wants to increase its influence it must, therefore, make greater efforts in the field of foreign policy. With regards to its neighbours, the EU must aim to avoid any new division of the continent or any rigid demarcation between itself and the Islamic southern Mediterranean area. In this way it will also avoid provoking a new political confrontation against the background of a distinct prosperity gap and political differences.
IV. Different strategies for different neighbours
After the enlargement of 1 May 2004, the EU will have new neighbours in the East and South East and will have to consolidate its policy towards its Mediterranean neighbours. To this end, it will have to refine the instruments at its disposal and apply them in a flexible way. The EU will also have to establish different approaches to the different challenges from these states.
This applies to Europe's international political action as a whole, although it should be remembered that foreign policy begins on one's own doorstep. In line with its perception of itself, Europe does not regard its direct neighbours as competitors, let alone enemies. This too is evidence of the unique nature of European integration; unlike other associations of states, the EU defines itself not through an external opponent, but from within.
The fact that the Union always regards its neighbours as partners does not mean it can adopt the same policy towards every country. Its neighbours are too different, which means that cooperation must be based on different strategies. The first step towards defining these strategies is to establish Europe's interests vis-à-vis neighbouring states and regions. During this process, the EU will have to differentiate in both geographical and political terms. It must respect its own fundamental values, while also bearing in mind the specific significance for Europe of each neighbouring region.
The EU must, therefore, develop co-ordinated instruments that are appropriate to each given situation and set the corresponding priorities. Its approach must go beyond the rigid categorisation reflected in the association agreements and pre-accession arrangements. If Europe is not to overstretch itself, it must only offer the prospect of accession to very few states now. However, it should consider membership applications from its new eastern neighbours and call on these states to move towards guaranteeing the rule of law according to the Copenhagen criteria.
Despite the difficulties it experienced as a result of the Middle East conflict, the Barcelona process is an example of a sophisticated approach in that it focused on the cooperation between Europe and its neighbouring regions on concrete problems and possibilities.
The Commission's initial proposals (featuring in two communications on the relations with Europe's Southern and Eastern Neighbours and on the integration of the Western Balkans) should serve as a useful basis for further discussion. A prime concern is to clarify on what basis the EU can cooperate with its Eastern European and Mediterranean neighbours without either overstretching itself or creating a sharp dividing line.
The political decision-makers must bear in mind that the EU's future border regions already present a number of security risks. These risks do not currently pose a threat to the EU's security in military terms. One of the risks is the growing and constantly increasing pressure of migration in North Africa, as a result of the growing population. There are also problems of environmental protection and energy security resulting from the use of nuclear energy in Eastern Europe and the EU's dependence on oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea area and from various regions in the Russian Federation.
V. Russia and the new neighbours in the East
The enlarged EU will have a new neighbouring region, consisting of Russia, the Western Commonwealth of Independent States and, indirectly, the Caucasus. These new neighbours differ significantly from the former Central and Eastern European neighbours. There still remain a great deal of work to do in defining the EU's policy with regard to these new neighbours. The EU's approach must encompass not only economic issues but also questions of human rights, democratisation and security.
The 2004 enlargement will give the EU a number of new neighbours in the East. Russia is the largest and most important new neighbour, to which the EU already attaches great importance prior to enlargement. This is both because of the Russian tradition of regarding Europe as a point of reference, especially in cultural matters, and because Russia is so important to Europe in terms of security policy and the economy.
In terms of security policy, Russia is closely linked to the European Nato partners, including the Central and Eastern European states, through the Nato-Russia Council. Russia has strong security policy interests in Eastern Europe, as well as in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea areas. Russia also continues to play a strong role globally, as a permanent member of the Security Council, a nuclear power and, not least, due to its relations with India and China in the Asian region.
At the same time, the economic links between the EU and Russia are of great importance. The EU is Russia's main trade partner, in terms of both imports and exports. Oil products account for nearly half of the EU's imports from Russia, while other major imports consist almost exclusively of primary products, mainly precious and base metals. The EU has a growing balance of trade deficit with Russia, amounting to a total of 25.6 billion € in 2000, compared with 5.3 billion € in 1995.
Any European strategy towards Russia must take account of these factors. In addition, the fact that Russia will become an immediate neighbour will give rise to practical questions that need pragmatic solutions, such as the question of transit traffic between Kaliningrad and the Russian heartland.
The EU cannot avoid a critical dialogue with Russia about developments in its society nor can the EU ignore Russia's continuing strong influence in some of the former soviet republics.
The conflict in Chechnya still seems far from a peaceful solution. This conflict is costing human lives on both sides and further destabilising the Caucasus region. A peaceful solution must be found to this conflict, which has now lasted nearly a decade. The priority must be to find a compromise that will both guarantee the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and allow the Chechnyan people to live in dignity, giving them the freedom to organise their own cultural and political life on a democratic basis. The EU, in association with the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, can play a supportive and mediating role.
Similar pragmatic questions arise in relation to Europe's other neighbours in the East, namely Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The major issues concern border security, the prevention of illegal migration and support for democratisation processes and regional trade cooperation.
In the case of Belarus, the various political actors (both the state and civil society) in the EU must coordinate more closely in future with a view to achieving greater democracy in the country and improving its economic situation. In this respect the USA’s desire to play a more active role in the EU's eastern neighbouring country is important.2 EU level actors must not confine their activities to relations with the official structures of the Belarus Republic, but initiate policies which assist a democratic regime change.
In Ukraine, one of the most highly populated European states, the process of economic and political transformation has not yet proved successful in many respects. Groups operating on an oligarchic basis have gained control of the economy and political structures both nationally and regionally. Incentives need to be offered, by means of cooperation proposals with concrete conditions and by strengthening the democratic forces, so that the country can develop in line with the European mainstream.
In Moldova, only some of the state structures are functioning, since the eastern part of the country is refusing to submit to the authority of the central government. Although the civil war has ended, the country remains split and is by far the poorest in Europe with a per capita GDP of 1.8% of the EU average. This means that Moldova remains a potential source of conflict. The EU must help it build up state structures and stimulate economic activity.
In all these states, the EU should do more to ensure respect for democratic processes (holding free and fair elections at the due time) and fundamental human rights. New instruments of economic cooperation need to be found for the entire region between the EU's new eastern border and the Russian Federation. In the case of Belarus, this is conditional on a move towards democratisation.
The EU's indirect neighbours in the East include the Caucasian Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. A whole range of conflicts have been destabilising the Caucasus for more than a decade and could spill over to other regions given these countries' importance in terms of energy policy and their closeness to Russia and to the Middle East. Moreover, the internal political development in all three states looks problematic in political terms, since either state structures are disintegrating or there are emerging signs of a trend towards authoritarianism.
The EU's foreign policy approach must include making constructive use of and involving existing institutions, notably the Council of Europe and the OSCE, since their structures include every European Member State.
VI. South East Europe
The EU has offered the South East European states a definite prospect of accession. Until this accession, the date of which has not yet been fixed, a number of economic, political and security issues need to be clarified. Time will tell whether the EU will have to treat the individual states separately or as a regional bloc.
Similar priorities need to be set in regard to the South East European states. In view of the civil wars in former Yugoslavia and ethnic problems and conflicts in other South East European states, the EU must continue its endeavours to stabilise these states, some of them young, and to prevent potential conflicts. The Stability Pact for the Balkans, which reflects a major political and material commitment on the part of Europe, must be pursued at a high level. At the same time, the EU must continue to take active political and, where appropriate, military conflict-prevention measures.
Yet the Stability Pact can only help these countries to help themselves. If South East Europe is to achieve peace and development on a long-term basis, it will have to make considerable efforts itself and be prepared to resolve conflicts peacefully, aside from receiving external aid. That is the only way to achieve the aim of gradually integrating all the countries of South East Europe into European structures.
There must be consistent use of the association process, while the question of individual states' accession to the EU has to be evaluated on the basis of the results achieved. Romania and Bulgaria have an annual GNP of no more than US $ 1 670 and 1 520 per capita respectively, which means they are more than US $ 1000 below that of all the other candidate states including Turkey, despite the latter's fluctuating and frequently negative growth rates3. Before they join, they will therefore have to make a considerable effort if they really want to benefit from accession to the EU.
Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia and Albania have similar economic data. However, some of the countries in this region are developing dynamic economies, despite weak economic conditions resulting from transformation crises and the aftermath of war in the 1990s. However, domestic tensions remain prevalent. Albania in particular has institutional difficulties, despite being an important example of a secularised Muslim state. It is in the EU's interest to continue to promote stability in these states, regardless of whether they have any immediate prospects for accession. Since religious and ethnic tensions are interdependent in these countries, the EU must continue to pursue a common strategy towards them.
It remains to be seen whether Croatia will be able to join the EU sooner than its southern neighbours. Its economic performance is considerably better (per capita GNP of US $ 4 620), but it faces structural economic problems. It also needs to further stabilise the democratic state and ensure cooperation with European and international organisations, in particular the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. Other EU membership conditions include the return of refugees and the restoration of their property, as well as practical long-term evidence of respect for minority rights.
Europe should aim to draw up a road map for the accession of the other Western Balkan states, in addition to offering Bulgaria and Romania the prospect of accession during this decade. Here it must be made clear that Europe will not tolerate any armed ethnic conflicts or the formation of new states. With reference in particular to Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro, despite the recent outbursts of organised violence, we do not advocate redrawing present borders, as it might set off dangerous precedents for other states to question their borders in this highly volatile area. There must be progress towards offering the Western Balkan states a common prospect for an accession date, so that existing and potential conflicts between various peoples and states can be transformed into cooperation. In this respect the PES believes it is important that social democratic forces are playing a decisive role in most of the states of this region.
VII. Turkey
The Copenhagen Summit set out the next steps in relation to Turkey's accession to the EU. Respect for the Copenhagen criteria thus remains the yardstick for further progress towards accession and once these political criteria are fulfilled, accession negotiations should start. The prospect of accession has led the Turkish government to take encouraging and courageous steps to undertake the necessary reforms.
However, in spite of the determination of the government a clear framework for guaranteeing political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights is not yet established and it will require tremendous efforts to underline the drastic and fundamental character of the transformation of Turkey towards possible EU-membership. Turkey will also have to reinforce all political and cultural methods to increase Turkish citizen's knowledge of the EU's ideals and values. An active and free civil society and engagement and cooperation with NGOs will be of crucial importance to strengthen the democratic nature of the society.
At the same time the EU itself must be pepared for Turkey's possible accession and the new geo-political situation. A detailed debate about the consequences still has to take place.
The EU would need urgent reforms in a number of key policy areas such as agricultural and structural funds policy as well as in financial and institutional terms in order to cope with further enlargements. We also have to reflect how Europe can maintain its social model and achieve economic and social cohesion.
Due to Turkey's specific geographic, economic and cultural situation and the weight of its population it will be a parntner of special importance.
In the event that accession negotiations with Turkey do not begin in the near future, the question arises whether other forms of security policy cooperation between the EU and Turkey would be appropriate. During this whole process it is important to achieve the objectives that have been set rather than following timetables that might at times prove unrealistic.
VIII. The Mediterranean region
Thanks to the Barcelona process the EU has been pursuing a strategy towards the Mediterranean region since the mid 1990s. The major issues at stake here relate to problems of migration and the Middle East conflict. The EU must continue to take a systematic approach to these problems in order to improve security in the region.
Security policy concerns also play an important part in the EU's cooperation with the Mediterranean region, as reflected for example in the Charter for Peace and Stability in the framework of the Barcelona process4. Here, the Israel-Palestine conflict and related conflicts will continue to have special significance for Europe and require an EU commitment over and above the Barcelona process. This applies just as much to the activities in the context of the Middle East Quartet as to aid for the Palestinian Autonomous Authority and the special relations with Israel. Security policy issues are also prominent throughout the Mediterranean area, not least in regard to combating terrorism.
In addition, the EU must do more to formulate a preventive policy in face of a possible influx of migrants that could exceed the EU's absorption capacity. Over the last 20 years the population growth in the region was ca. 2.5%5 a year, compared with 0.4% in the EU.
As its biggest trading partner (47% of all the region's imports come from the EU, 56% of exports go to the Union) the EU also has a special responsibility, which will further increase if a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area is established by 2010.
The economic and social development of the Mediterranean region is the key to the long-term prevention of terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. For this reason, the Barcelona process and the MEDA programme need to be reinforced.
Europe and the USA must enhance their cooperation in the Mediterranian region. In the area of traditional security policy we invite NATO to closer cooperation with the EU, on the basis of NATO's multiple initiatives and experiences.
IX. Challenges facing EU policy
The EU must prioritise the adaptation of its foreign policy strategies and instruments for the post-enlargement period. It must review the existing structures and means of assistance at its disposal and develop new measures where necessary.
In order to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities resulting from its new neighbours, the EU needs to formulate a post-enlargement strategy for European foreign policy. It will have to establish different approaches for each different region, which is on concrete situations, reflects the Union's interests and takes adequate account of its neighbours' interests.
In this context, it is necessary to clarify whether the EU's external assistance programmes (Tacis, MEDA and CARDS) and other financial resources (located in the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) are adequate in terms of both quantity and quality and whether the partners are using them in the appropriate manner. It is also worth considering whether new instruments should be created in certain cases, for example, an investment bank jointly established by the Russian Federation and the European Union.
One instrument for achieving this could be the common strategies that have been set out in the Common Foreign and Security Policy since the Amsterdam Treaty and that have existed for Russia and the Mediterranean since 1999 and 2000 respectively. Matters relating to association agreements, free trade areas and accession prospects should also be regulated in this context. At the same time, there is a need to check again whether association agreements should in general be directed at eventual accession. The strategies should cover all aspects of political, security policy, economic and also cultural questions. Their main focus must differ according to region: there should be no uniform blueprint for the enlarged EU's strategies towards its neighbours.
Europeans must be able to represent their common interests effectively and to that end determine common, long-term prospects that are fully endorsed by all Member States. The countries that will join the Union in 2004 must, therefore, be involved in the formulation of common strategies at an early stage, given that they will become regions that border directly on Eastern and South East Europe.
X. PES tasks
As one of the main political forces in the European Union, the PES must play a major role on two levels. First, it must build on or establish partnership and cooperation with the parties of the neighbouring regions. Second, it should use its influence vis-à-vis the EU institutions in order to ensure that the EU pursues a forward-looking foreign policy.
Even at this stage the PES must prepare itself for the fact that its new Eastern and South Eastern neighbours will have features that distinguish them from its current neighbours. This means that the PES must be more proactive in the Eastern European countries – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and, not least, Russia – in order to pave the way for political developments in line with its ideas.
Much the same applies to the Balkan states that EU membership aspirations. The PES must build on links with existing strong social democratic forces in some of these countries.
The PES will formulate a policy towards the Mediterranean parties.
It is crucial that trade unions and NGOs play a major role in many of these countries and that the PES establish a dialogue with them. At the same time, Western European social democrats face the problem that their ideological orientation sometimes meets with little sympathy in the Eastern and South East European countries because of the latter's historical experiences.
As an overall strategy, the PES will intensify its activities in these regions, formulate a policy of PES membership, co-ordinate the policy of its member parties more closely and improve the existing instruments (such as the Forum for Democracy and Solidarity). This also means close cooperation with political organisations of a social democratic tendency and with the PES Group in the European Parliament. Over and above this, it is the task of the PES to uphold its foreign policy approach towards and within the EU institutions with a view to directing European foreign policy along these lines.
